new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From 58b6e97a9eef866e9e479fb781aaaf59fb11ef36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
+Date: Mon Apr 25 12:17:40 2022 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] passwd: erase password copy on all error branches
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-4641
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/58b6e97a9eef866e9e479fb781aaaf59fb11ef36]
+
+Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <soumya.sambu@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/passwd.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/passwd.c b/src/passwd.c
+index 80531ec..8c6f81a 100644
+--- a/src/passwd.c
++++ b/src/passwd.c
+@@ -289,6 +289,7 @@ static int new_password (const struct passwd *pw)
+ cp = getpass (_("New password: "));
+ if (NULL == cp) {
+ memzero (orig, sizeof orig);
++ memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (warned && (strcmp (pass, cp) != 0)) {
+@@ -316,6 +317,7 @@ static int new_password (const struct passwd *pw)
+ cp = getpass (_("Re-enter new password: "));
+ if (NULL == cp) {
+ memzero (orig, sizeof orig);
++ memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (strcmp (cp, pass) != 0) {
+--
+2.40.0
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+From 65c88a43a23c2391dcc90c0abda3e839e9c57904 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+Date: Sat, 10 Jun 2023 16:20:05 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] gpasswd(1): Fix password leak
+
+How to trigger this password leak?
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+When gpasswd(1) asks for the new password, it asks twice (as is usual
+for confirming the new password). Each of those 2 password prompts
+uses agetpass() to get the password. If the second agetpass() fails,
+the first password, which has been copied into the 'static' buffer
+'pass' via STRFCPY(), wasn't being zeroed.
+
+agetpass() is defined in <./libmisc/agetpass.c> (around line 91), and
+can fail for any of the following reasons:
+
+- malloc(3) or readpassphrase(3) failure.
+
+ These are going to be difficult to trigger. Maybe getting the system
+ to the limits of memory utilization at that exact point, so that the
+ next malloc(3) gets ENOMEM, and possibly even the OOM is triggered.
+ About readpassphrase(3), ENFILE and EINTR seem the only plausible
+ ones, and EINTR probably requires privilege or being the same user;
+ but I wouldn't discard ENFILE so easily, if a process starts opening
+ files.
+
+- The password is longer than PASS_MAX.
+
+ The is plausible with physical access. However, at that point, a
+ keylogger will be a much simpler attack.
+
+And, the attacker must be able to know when the second password is being
+introduced, which is not going to be easy.
+
+How to read the password after the leak?
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Provoking the leak yourself at the right point by entering a very long
+password is easy, and inspecting the process stack at that point should
+be doable. Try to find some consistent patterns.
+
+Then, search for those patterns in free memory, right after the victim
+leaks their password.
+
+Once you get the leak, a program should read all the free memory
+searching for patterns that gpasswd(1) leaves nearby the leaked
+password.
+
+On 6/10/23 03:14, Seth Arnold wrote:
+> An attacker process wouldn't be able to use malloc(3) for this task.
+> There's a handful of tools available for userspace to allocate memory:
+>
+> - brk / sbrk
+> - mmap MAP_ANONYMOUS
+> - mmap /dev/zero
+> - mmap some other file
+> - shm_open
+> - shmget
+>
+> Most of these return only pages of zeros to a process. Using mmap of an
+> existing file, you can get some of the contents of the file demand-loaded
+> into the memory space on the first use.
+>
+> The MAP_UNINITIALIZED flag only works if the kernel was compiled with
+> CONFIG_MMAP_ALLOW_UNINITIALIZED. This is rare.
+>
+> malloc(3) doesn't zero memory, to our collective frustration, but all the
+> garbage in the allocations is from previous allocations in the current
+> process. It isn't leftover from other processes.
+>
+> The avenues available for reading the memory:
+> - /dev/mem and /dev/kmem (requires root, not available with Secure Boot)
+> - /proc/pid/mem (requires ptrace privileges, mediated by YAMA)
+> - ptrace (requires ptrace privileges, mediated by YAMA)
+> - causing memory to be swapped to disk, and then inspecting the swap
+>
+> These all require a certain amount of privileges.
+
+How to fix it?
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+memzero(), which internally calls explicit_bzero(3), or whatever
+alternative the system provides with a slightly different name, will
+make sure that the buffer is zeroed in memory, and optimizations are not
+allowed to impede this zeroing.
+
+This is not really 100% effective, since compilers may place copies of
+the string somewhere hidden in the stack. Those copies won't get zeroed
+by explicit_bzero(3). However, that's arguably a compiler bug, since
+compilers should make everything possible to avoid optimizing strings
+that are later passed to explicit_bzero(3). But we all know that
+sometimes it's impossible to have perfect knowledge in the compiler, so
+this is plausible. Nevertheless, there's nothing we can do against such
+issues, except minimizing the time such passwords are stored in plain
+text.
+
+Security concerns
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+We believe this isn't easy to exploit. Nevertheless, and since the fix
+is trivial, this fix should probably be applied soon, and backported to
+all supported distributions, to prevent someone else having more
+imagination than us to find a way.
+
+Affected versions
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+All. Bug introduced in shadow 19990709. That's the second commit in
+the git history.
+
+Fixes: 45c6603cc86c ("[svn-upgrade] Integrating new upstream version, shadow (19990709)")
+Reported-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+Cc: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
+Cc: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
+Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
+Cc: Balint Reczey <rbalint@debian.org>
+Cc: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
+Cc: David Runge <dvzrv@archlinux.org>
+Cc: Andreas Jaeger <aj@suse.de>
+Cc: <~hallyn/shadow@lists.sr.ht>
+Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-4641
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/65c88a43a23c2391dcc90c0abda3e839e9c57904]
+
+Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <soumya.sambu@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/gpasswd.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/gpasswd.c b/src/gpasswd.c
+index c7c9477..00ca569 100644
+--- a/src/gpasswd.c
++++ b/src/gpasswd.c
+@@ -896,6 +896,7 @@ static void change_passwd (struct group *gr)
+ strzero (cp);
+ cp = getpass (_("Re-enter new password: "));
+ if (NULL == cp) {
++ memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
+ exit (1);
+ }
+
+--
+2.40.0
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases/download/v${PV}/${BP}
file://useradd \
file://CVE-2023-29383.patch \
file://0001-Overhaul-valid_field.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-4641-0001.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-4641-0002.patch \
"
SRC_URI:append:class-target = " \